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Civil Procedure. Christy’s Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Massachusetts
Homeland Insurance Co., 204 A.3d 1071 (R.I. 2019). The
affirmative defense of standing is not waived when it is raised in a
motion for summary judgment after not having been pled in an
answer or reply, and there is no standing when a plaintiff seeks a
declaratory judgment against a tortfeasor’s insurer before receiving
a judgment against the tortfeasor, as there is no injury-in-fact.1
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case arises from a dispute concerning liability related to a
motor vehicle accident that occurred in October 2012 when
Christian Lanoie (Mr. Lanoie) was driving a truck he rented from
Christy’s Auto Rentals, Inc. (Christy’s). 2 At the time, Mr. Lanoie
was employed as a manager by a barbecue food vendor.3 On
October 9, 2012, Mr. Lanoie entered a Rental Agreement
(Agreement) with Christy’s to rent a box truck for one day. 4 He
intended to use the truck to transport his employer’s barbecue
equipment, used at a seasonal fair in Massachusetts, to the vendor’s
home location.5 When entering the Agreement, Mr. Lanoie
declined to purchase the offered “Liability Protection” option, and
instead agreed to a provision, as shown by his initialing next to it,
that signified that he “agree[d] to be responsible for all damage or
loss” he might cause to others while operating the truck. 6 Mr.
Lanoie had personal automobile insurance coverage through a
policy with Massachusetts Homeland Insurance Company
(Homeland) which was in effect when he executed the Agreement. 7
1. Christy’s Auto Rentals, Inc. v. Mass. Homeland Ins. Co., 204 A.3d
1071, 1072 (R.I. 2019).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1072–73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
7. Id. at 1073.
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While using the truck at the fair in Massachusetts, Mr. Lanoie
collided with a concession trailer, causing some damage to a corner
of the rented truck and $1300 worth of damage to the concession
trailer. 8 Christy’s paid the damages to the concession trailer’s
owner in December 2012. 9
In April 2014, Christy’s filed two suits. 10 One suit was filed
against Mr. Lanoie to recover the amount paid to the concession
trailer’s owners, as well as to recover for the damage incurred to the
rented box truck.11 The other suit was a declaratory judgment
action against both Mr. Lanoie 12 and Homeland.13 Christy’s sought
a declaration that the damages Mr. Lanoie caused to both the box
truck and the concession trailer were covered under his policy with
Homeland. 14 Christy’s complaint also asserted that there was an
actual dispute between Christy’s and Homeland under the
insurance policy between Mr. Lanoie and Homeland, and that the
Superior Court had jurisdiction to make a declaratory judgment
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). 15
Homeland answered by denying both that Mr. Lanoie’s policy
covered the damages in question, and by denying Christy’s
aforementioned assertions about both the Superior Court’s
jurisdiction under the UDJA and the existence of an actual dispute
between itself and Christy’s. 16
Homeland next filed a motion for summary judgment claiming
that Christy’s lacked standing because there was no material issue
of fact in dispute regarding Homeland’s liability to Christy’s.17
Christy’s then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, which
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Mr. Lanoie, however, is a nominal defendant who was joined in the
action due to a requirement in the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, found
in Rhode Island General Laws section 9-30-2, and thus is not discussed as a
defendant in this case. Id. at 1073 n.2.
13. Id. at 1073.
14. Id.
15. Id. Christy’s argued the Superior Court’s jurisdiction was derived from
Rhode Island General Laws section 9-30-1, which generally allows a court to
issue declaratory judgments. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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argued that Homeland had waived the ability to bring a standing
defense by not asserting that defense in its answer, and that
Christy’s had standing under the UDJA. 18
Two hearings were conducted before the hearing justice on the
issue of standing.19 At the final hearing, the hearing justice issued
a bench decision in which he ruled that the issue of standing was
not waived because it was raised in a motion for summary judgment
where Christy’s had ample opportunity to argue against it, which
they in fact did. 20 Having decided that, the hearing justice then
entertained the substantive question of Christy’s standing, and
held that Christy’s did not have standing because they had not yet
secured a judgment against the tortfeasor, Mr. Lanoie, and thus
could not have standing against his insurer.21 Therefore, due to
lack of standing, the hearing justice determined that Christy’s
claim was barred. 22 The hearing justice granted Homeland’s
motion for summary judgment and denied Christy’s cross-motion,
and Christy’s timely appealed to the Rhode Island Supreme Court
(the Court). 23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In adjudicating Christy’s appeal, the Court reviewed the
summary judgment motions de novo, and in doing so, considered
two issues: first, whether Homeland’s defense of Christy’s lack of
standing was procedurally waived by being brought for the first
time in a summary judgment motion; and second, if it were not
waived, whether Christy’s had standing to bring a declaratory
judgment action against Homeland. 24

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1073–74.
21. Id. at 1074. The hearing justice noted that this requirement for a
judgment against the tortfeasor to create standing for a suit against the
tortfeasor’s insurer had not yet been clearly decided by the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, but he pointed towards “language” indicating that it was
accepted as a requirement in both Rhode Island and “most other jurisdictions.”
Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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The Court began by discussing the first issue—procedural
waiver of an affirmative defense of lack of standing. 25 Christy’s
argued that Rule 8(c) and Rule 12(h) of the Superior Court Rules of
Civil Procedure, which work together to waive defenses
enumerated in Rule 8(c) if they are not asserted in an initial motion,
answer, or reply, operate as a bar against a defense of lack of
standing that is not brought in an initial motion or an answer or
reply. 26 However, as the Court pointed out, Rule 8(c) does not
include standing in its list of affirmative defenses that, according to
Rule 12(h), are waived if not raised in a motion, answer or reply. 27
Christy’s next argued, however, that a previous Rhode Island
case finding the defense of standing waived, Direct Action for Rights
and Equality v. Gannon, was applicable, and supported a finding
that standing should be waived if not properly pled in a motion or
an answer.28 However, the Court distinguished Direct Action
because the issue of standing was never raised before trial, and thus
impliedly, the defendant had no chance to respond. 29 In contrast,
here, the issue of standing was discussed in both parties’
memoranda and was debated during the course of two pretrial
hearings. 30
Additionally, the Court determined that even if standing was
found in the list of Rule 8(c)’s waivable defenses, the Court would
still find that raising the issue at the summary judgment stage was
sufficient here given the “totality of what transpired in the Superior
Court,” specifically, that Christy’s had the ability to, and did in fact,
argue the substantive issue of standing before the hearing justice. 31
The Court therefore found that Christy’s was not prejudiced by the
standing issue being raised when it was, thus the Court found that
the defense of lack of standing was not waived. 32
The Court next considered whether Christy’s had standing to
bring a declaratory judgment claim against Homeland as Mr.
25. Id. at 1074–75.
26. Id. at 1075.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Direct Action for Rights and Equality v. Gannon, 713 A.2d
218 (R.I. 1998)).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1073.
31. Id. at 1075–76.
32. Id. at 1076.
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Lanoie’s insurer.33 Christy’s argued that it had standing under the
UDJA. 34 However, the Court pointed to an earlier decision, Bowen
v. Mollis, which stated that without an “actual justiciable
controversy,” the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction under the
UDJA. 35 Although Christy’s looked to earlier Rhode Island
Supreme Court decisions that had left the issue of whether
standing existed in similar factual situations undecided, the Court
distinguished those previous cases because the issue of standing
had not been briefed. 36 Here, by contrast, the substantive issue of
standing had been fully briefed and argued, and thus the Court
found it necessary to “grapple with that long-deferred issue.” 37 In
so grappling, the Court relied on its jurisprudence requiring an
injury-in-fact as the starting point to finding standing. 38 The Court
found that because Christy’s had not yet established liability
against Mr. Lanoie nor received a judgment against him, its
asserted injury attributable to Homeland, namely Homeland’s
refusal to indemnify Mr. Lanoie, was entirely hypothetical, and
thus not yet a cognizable injury.39
In addition, the Court held that Christy’s was not a party to the
insurance policy between Mr. Lanoie and Homeland, and thus could
not seek its interpretation or enforcement.40 The Court did note
that Christy’s might one day have standing for a remedy.41 If and
when Christy’s obtained a judgment against Mr. Lanoie and was
unable to collect on that judgment, it would have an actual injury33. Id.
34. Id. The Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act provides in relevant part:
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other
writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or
validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or
franchise, and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal
relations thereunder.
Id. (quoting 9 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-30-2).
35. Id. (citing Bowen v. Mollis, 945 A.2d 314, 317 (R.I. 2008)).
36. Id. (citing Mendez v. Bright, 849 A.2d 329, 332 n.2 (R.I. 2004) and
Robinson v. Mayo, 849 A.2d 351, 353 n.2 (R.I. 2004)).
37. Id. at 1077.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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in-fact that would no longer be hypothetical, enabling it to bring a
suit against Homeland. 42
Accordingly, the Court both found that the issue of standing
was not waived by Homeland’s failure to assert the issue in its
answer, and found a substantive lack of standing for Christy’s
declaratory judgment action against Homeland due to no injury-infact and no privity of contract with the agreement in question, and
therefore affirmed both of the Superior Court’s judgments.43
COMMENTARY
The Supreme Court’s two justifications for finding no waiver of
the defense of standing are not equally compelling—the first makes
good sense, the second, less so. The Court’s finding that the
Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure do not mention standing
in the list of waivable defenses is simple and airtight—it is
apparent that standing is not in the enumerated list found under
Rule 8(c), and therefore, was not contemplated by the rules as a
waivable defense.44
However, the Court’s decision to go beyond that argument is
puzzling. In the additional reasoning for the conclusion that the
defense was not waived, the Court states that because Christy’s had
an ability to defend against the lack of standing argument raised in
the motion for summary judgment, it would have been permissible
to find the defense not waived even if it had been found in Rule
8(c). 45 This seems to contradict the force and logic behind Rules
8(c) and 12(h), which work in tandem to bar defenses when they are
not raised in an initial motion, answer, or reply. Although the
Court cites to previous cases where they have held similarly, 46 this
line of thinking might lead to a situation where each case that
raised a potential waiver of a defense would need to be evaluated
individually to determine whether the defense was raised at an
appropriate time, even when there was a rule covering the exact

42. Id. at 1078.
43. Id.
44. See id. at 1075.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1075–76. See McNulty v. Chip, 116 A.3d 173, 180–81 (R.I. 2015);
Industrial Nat’l Bank v. Peloso, 121 A.2d 1312, 1314 (R.I. 1979); Air-Lite Prod.,
Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 347 A.2d 623, 629 (1975).
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situation. The Court’s second justification could easily lead to
confusion on the application of Rules 8(c) and 12(h), a proliferation
of arguments on whether a plaintiff had an appropriate chance to
respond to a defense, and ultimately, wasted judicial resources.
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that there was no
procedural waiver of the defense of lack of standing when it had
been brought in a summary judgment motion but not in a previous
answer or reply when the issue had been fully briefed and argued
in front of the hearing justice. Additionally, the Court held that
because there was no injury-in-fact, there was a lack of standing
when a party brought a declaratory judgment action against a
tortfeasor’s insurer prior to receiving a judgment against the
tortfeasor and not being able to collect it.
Tatiana Gomez

